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PRESIDENTIAL ADMINISTRATION AND
THE TRADITIONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Thomas W Merrill*
American administrative law has long been characterized by two
distinct traditions: the positivist and the process traditions. The positivist
tradition emphasizes that administrative bodies are created by law and
must act in accordance with the requirements of the law. The process
tradition emphasizes that agencies must act in accordance with norms of
reasoned decisionmaking, which emphasize that all relevant interests must
be given an opportunity to express their views and agencies must explain
their decisions in a public and articulatefashion. In the twentieth century,
American administrative law achieved a grand synthesis of these two
traditions, with the result that deficienciesfrom the positivist perspectivesuch as very broad delegations of discretion to agencies-were acceptable,
as long as process norms were vigorously enforced. ProfessorPeter Strauss
and other architects of this synthesis never envisioned that the process
tradition could completely displace positive law. In recent years, however,
commentators have begun to argue that the process tradition can take on a
life
of its own and canfunction as a complete substitutefor the positivist
tradition. This can be seen in a variety of contexts where traditions of
legislative supremacy are weak, such as multinational treaty regimes and
various forms of "presidential administration." This Essay offers some
groundsfor skepticism about the long-term prospects of an administrative
law based solely on the process tradition. When acting in the positivist
tradition, courts function as agents of sovereignty. Their judgments,
assuming they are perceived as beingfaithful to the law, are backed by the
sovereign power of the state, which means they are likely to be obeyed. The
process tradition rests on norms of reasonableness, as to which reasonable
people may disagree. Especially where judicial review is weak or
nonexistent, internal review institutions are unlikely to have enough institutional capital to impose their judgments about reasonableness on other
government actors. Enforcement of administrative law norms may come to
be seen as merely a matter of contestable opinion. Instead of acting as a
check on administrative abuse, administrative law may devolve into a
rationalizationfor the exercise of raw power

* Charles Evans Hughes Professor, Columbia Law School. My principal thanks goes
to Peter Strauss, honoree of this Symposium, for his consistent inspiration, support, and
for his not infrequent rescuing of me from potential folly.
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INTRODUCTION

Administrative law has always been concerned with constraints on
executive action. Historically, administrative law scholars have focused
primarily on constraints imposed by courts through judicial review of
administrative agency action.' This Essay sketches two broad traditions that
have played a critical role in the evolution of judicial review of agency
action-the positivist tradition and the process tradition. Where judicial
review is available, both traditions continue to play an important role
today.2 In contrast, where judicial review is not available and the primary
constraint on administrative action comes from internal review within the
executive itself, there are signs-necessarily tentative and inconclusivethat the process tradition has greater appeal.' The question this Essay
raises is whether an expanded sphere of "presidential administration" 4
that operates free of the constraints ofjudicial review can be meaningfully
constrained by precepts drawn from the process tradition.
What are the key features of the traditions developed in the context of
judicial review? Under the positivist tradition, the critical question is
whether the government agency has legal authority for the action it is
taking.5 Administrators must justify their actions in terms of some higher
1. The classic works are John Dickinson, Administrative Justice and the Supremacy of
Law in the United States (1927), and Louis L.Jaffe,Judicial Control of Administrative Action
(1965). Modern casebooks, including the one edited by Peter Strauss, are dominated by
issues that arise in the course of judicial review of agency actions. Peter L. Strauss et al.,
Gellhorn and Byse's Administrative Law: Cases and Comments chs. 7-9 (11 th ed. 2011).
2. See infra Part I (discussing "Grand Synthesis" of positivist and process traditions
and its continuing relevance today).
3. See infra Part II (discussing pure process approaches in both European Union
and American governments).
4. See generally Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 2245,
2246 (2001) (defining presidential administration as form of governance in which
regulatory activity of executive branch becomes extension of President's policy and
political agenda).
5. See, e.g., Henry P. Monaghan, The Protective Power of the Presidency, 93 Colum.
L. Rev. 1, 5 n.27 (1993) (noting requirement of legal authority is "so deeply ingrained in
our constitutional tradition that it is seldom articulated"); Daphna Renan, Pooling Powers,
115 Colum. L. Rev. 211, 220 (2015) ("As a legal matter, an agency requires affirmative
authority to undertake any type of action. The source of that legal authority is generally
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law, such as the Constitution or a statute. Professor Richard Stewart
famously described this as the "transmission belt" model of administrative
law.6 In democratic regimes, power is said to flow from the people, acting
to ratify the Constitution, to the elected legislature, to administrative
bodies established by the legislature. 7 Authority to act with the force of law
moves along a series of delegations, running from the people, to the
legislature, to administrators. The positivist tradition developed under the
assumption that some other institution-typically assumed to be the
courts-stands ready to block the actions of government agents when
those actions exceed the authority conferred by law.' At least in theory,
however, the requirement that an agency's action must conform to law can
also be enforced by institutions internal to the executive branch, such as
the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) in the justice Department.
Under the process tradition, the critical question is whether agency
action comports with reasoned decisionmaking.9 "Reasoned" here does
not refer to whether the decision conforms to higher law, but rather to
the manner in which the decision was reached.' 0 The process tradition
emphasizes that all relevant interests should be given an opportunity to
express their views, that these views must be fully considered, and that
agencies must explain their decisions in a public and logical fashion."
This conception of reasoned decisionmaking can plausibly be seen as

statutes, though in rarer instances it might be constitutional authority delegated by the
President." (footnote omitted)).
6. Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 Harv.
L. Rev. 1667, 1675 (1975).
7. Id. at 1671-76 (describing traditional model of administrative law).
8. See, e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw, Recovering American Administrative Law: Federalist
Foundations, 1787-1801, 115 Yale L.J. 1256, 1258 (2006) (noting American administrative
law has long assumed courts serve as checks on overreaching administrative agencies).
9. See, e.g., Indus. Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 E2d 467, 475 (D.C. Cir.
1974) (demanding "careful identification" by the Administrator "of the reasons why he
chooses to follow one course rather than another"). Process, as I use the term, is distinct
from procedure. See Gary Lawson, Outcome, Procedure and Process: Agency Duties of
Explanation for Legal Conclusions, 48 Rutgers L. Rev. 313, 318 (1996) (noting even if agency
complies with all applicable procedural rules, "chain of reasoning employed by the agency to
reach its conclusion" must "satisfy a minimum standard of rationality" whereby agency
explains why it "reached the conclusion that it did," which Lawson calls process review).
10. See, e.g., Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2706 (2015) ("Not only must an
agency's decreed result be within the scope of its lawful authority, but the process by which
it reaches that result must be logical and rational."' (quoting Allentown Mack Sales & Serv.,
Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359, 374 (1998))).
11. See, e.g., Int'l Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F2d 615, 652 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
(Bazelon, C.J., concurring) (arguing for public participation and transparency in agency
decisionmaking); Lisa Schultz Bressman, Procedures as Politics in Administrative Law, 107
Colum. L. Rev. 1749, 1762 (2007) (noting administrative law allows "broad public participation"); Ernest Gellhorn, Public Participation in Administrative Proceedings, 81 Yale LJ.359,
380-81 (1972) (discussing importance of public participation in agency decisionmaking).
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having been derived from the model of judicial decisionmaking.12 But
again it is not strictly dependent on the existence of an external enforcement agent like the courts. It can also be invoked as a norm that can be
internalized by government agents and which serves to legitimize their
decisions, without regard to whether those decisions are subject to review
by an external institution like a court. European scholars have generalized the process tradition in terms of norms of "transparency" and
"accountability," and this terminology has spread to the United States,
the birthplace of the process ideal. 3
In the United States, contemporary administrative law as applied by the
courts consists of a synthesis or integration of the positivist and process
traditions. Courts enforce "clear" commands found in the law that delegate
discretionary authority to agencies. 4 They also enforce norms of reasoned
decisionmaking, the content of which has been developed over time
through a process of common law elaboration. 5 When pressed, however,
courts justify such process norms as resting on interpretations of positive law,
most notably the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).1 6 Courts disclaim any
inherent power to develop process norms not grounded in positive law. 7
In the nineteenth century, administrative law was rooted exclusively
in the positivist tradition. Enforcement of legal constraints was spotty,
since there was no general means of securing judicial review of admin-

12. Thomas W. Merrill, Article III, Agency Adjudication, and the Origins of the
Appellate Review Model of Administrative Law, 111 Colum L. Rev. 939, 942 (2011)
[hereinafter Merrill, Article III].
13. For the European version, see, e.g., Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch & Richard B.
Stewart, The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, Law & Contemp. Probs.,
Summer/Autumn 2005, at 15, 17 (defining "global administrative law" to include "social
understandings" that promote "accountability of global administrative bodies, in particular by
ensuring they meet adequate standards of transparency, participation, reasoned decision, and
legality, and by providing effective review of the rules and decisions they make"). For the
American splashback, see, e.g., Mark Fenster, The Opacity of Transparency, 91 Iowa L. Rev. 885,
900 (2006) (" [Transparency] enables the free flow of information among public agencies and
private individuals, allowing input, review, and criticism of government action ... ."); Jennifer
Shkabatur, Transparency With (out) Accountability: Open Government in the United States, 31
Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 79, 82-84 (2012) (arguing for transparency and accountability in agency
actions as preconditions to democratic governance).
14. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984)
("If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as
the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.").
15. See Gillian E. Metzger, Foreword: Embracing Administrative Common Law, 80
Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1293, 1310 (2012) (arguing much of administrative law, including
norms of reasonable process, is form ofjudge-made common law).
16. See United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 244 (2d Cir.
1977) (grounding process norms in APA).
17. For example, courts will not review agency action on process grounds when the
action is unreviewable. See Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 601 (1988) (declining to review
claim that employee's dismissal from Central Intelligence Agency was arbitrary and
capricious because National Security Act precluded review of such claim).
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istrative action.'" It was necessary to find a common law writ like
mandamus in order to challenge the action or inaction of a government
agent. 9 If review was available, however, the courts would determine
whether the action was authorized by law.2" Little attention was given to
the process used by the government in reaching its decisions.
The twentieth century witnessed the growth of the administrative
state, which posed an enormous challenge to the positivist tradition.
Administrative agencies became more numerous and were delegated
large discretionary powers. 2' The expansion of the administrative state
created a demand for wider availability of judicial review in order to
police against abuses by administrators. Yet it made no sense to delegate
authority to administrative agencies and then have courts decide
everything all over again.2 2 Even if one had more faith in the courts than
in administrators, courts did not have the capacity or the expertise to
oversee everything agencies decided. 2' The solution, which was worked
out with great ingenuity over time, was to supplement the positivist
tradition with a new ideal-the process tradition. Courts would review
agency decisions to assure not only that they were consistent with law, but
also that they were reached in a reasoned fashion.2 4 This melding of the
two traditions began to take shape in the first half of the twentieth
century and was fully worked out in the second half of the twentieth
century. Professor Strauss, whom we honor with this Symposium, was one
of the foremost architects of this grand synthesis, and he remains unsur2
passed as an expositor of its many implications. 1

18. See Jerry L. Mashaw, Creating the Administrative Constitution: The Lost One
Hundred Years of American Administrative Law 301-08 (2012) [hereinafter Mashaw,
Creating the Administrative Constitution] (concluding review generally depended on
availability of common law action for damages or prerogative writ, but when it was
available courts decided matter de novo).
19. See id. at 65-78 (summarizing common law actions).
20. Merrill, Article III, supra note 12, at 951 (noting nineteenth-century administrative
law featured "little rhetoric of deference, and even less evidence of it in practice").
21. For an overview of the range of administrative functions, see Peter L. Strauss,
Administrative Justice in the United States 152-86 (2d ed. 2002); see also Agency List, Fed.
Reg., https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies [http://perma.cc/X9NN-KJ6N] (last visited
Aug. 8, 2015) (listing 438 current administrative agencies).
22. Dickinson, supra note 1, at 201-02 (arguing "double process" of administrative
judgment followed byjudicial review only "reduplicates the uncertainty").
23. See Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases PerYear: Some Implications of the
Supreme Court's Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 Colum. L.
Rev. 1093, 1095 (1987) [hereinafter Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases] (noting systemic
consequences of courts' limited capabilities for reviewing agency action).
24. See infra Part I (discussing this synthesis).
25. Among his works that have had the most influence with me, I would include Peter
L. Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation-of-Powers Questions-A
Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 Cornell L. Rev. 488 (1987); Peter L. Strauss, On Resegregating
the Worlds of Statute and Common Law, 1994 Sup. Ct. Rev. 429; Strauss, One Hundred
Fifty Cases, supra note 23; Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government:
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In the twenty-first century, we may or may not be on the threshold of
a new era in administrative law, in which the positivist tradition is significantly displaced by a dominant process tradition. It is too early to tell, but
there are signs that such a further evolution may be in the offing. The
driving force behind such a development is that administrative governance is increasingly outrunning legislative authorization.26 The clearest
example is found in treaty-based regimes like the European Union,
where an elaborate administrative apparatus has been established without the benefit of a delegation of power from a sovereign legislature
exercising equivalent power.27 It is not surprising in such a context that
administrative law scholars would seek to justify administrative edicts
exclusively in terms of the process tradition (articulated in terms of the
norms of transparency and accountability), since the positivist tradition
would suggest that such an exercise of governmental power is problematic. In the United States, the rise in power of the President and relative
decline of Congress has begun to generate analogous examples.2 s The
War on Terror and the Great Recession produced major expansions of
executive power, often justified by the need to respond to unprecedented
crises. 29 More recently, aggressive waivers of statutory requirements under
the Affordable Care Act (ACA)3 ° and President Barack Obama's effort to
reform immigration law by administrative action 3 1 present other examSeparation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 573 (1984); Peter L.
Strauss, Publication Rules in the Rulemaking Spectrum: Assuring Proper Respect for an
Essential Element, 53 Admin. L. Rev. 803 (2001); Peter L. Strauss, The Rulemaking
Continuum, 41 Duke L.J. 1463 (1992); see also infra notes 158, 160 & 177.
26. See infra Part II (describing examples of such potential overreach).
27. See id. (discussing European Union specifically).
28. E.g., Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec'y of Homeland Sec., to Leon
Rodriguez, Dir. of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Servs. et al., Exercising Prosecutorial
Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United States
as Children and with Respect to Certain Individuals Who Are the Parents of U.S.
Citizens or Permanent Residents (Nov. 20, 2014), http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/
publications/ 14_1120_memo_deferred-action.pdf [http://perma.cc/Z3QR-XQC7] [hereinafter Johnson Memorandum] (implementing presidential action regarding immigration
policy without explicit statutory authority); see also Exec. Order No. 13,693, Planning for
Federal Sustainability in the Next Decade, 80 Fed. Reg. 15,871 (Mar. 25, 2015) (directing
reduction in federal government's greenhouse gas emissions).
29. Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, The Executive Unbound: After the
Madisonian Republic 34-41 (2010).
30. See, e.g., Scott Gottlieb, Decision to Waive Obamacare Rules on Small Business
Health Plans Comes with Costs, Forbes (Mar. 5, 2014), http://avw.forbes.com/sites/
scottgottlieb/2014/03/05/white-houses-broken-rules-on-obamacare-put-law-injeopardy/
[http://perma.cc/4JJ5-8JQM] (discussing Obama Administration waiver for small businesses); Jon Healey, The Truth Behind All Those Obamacare Waivers, L.A. Times (Oct. 3,
2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/oct/03/news/la-ol-obamacare-waivers-exemptionshyperbole-20131002 [http://perma.cc/J6CG-3QD8] (discussing IRS waiving requirement
that companies with fifty or more employees offer certain minimum benefits).
31. Johnson Memorandum, supra note 28, at 1-5; Memorandum from Janet Napolitano,
Sec'y of Homeland Sec., to David V. Aguilar, Acting Comm'r, U.S. Customs and Border Prot. et
al., Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United
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ples. Not surprisingly, since the authority for these executive initiatives in
enacted law is often weak or nonexistent, supporters of these executive
acts have stressed the "transparent" manner in which they have been
developed, 32 and have cited the involvement of the President, who is
elected by all the people, as a sign of that these initiatives suffer from no
deficit of "accountability."3 These arguments are designed to confer
legitimacy on these efforts without regard to whether they have been
authorized by positive law.
The principal question posed by this Essay is whether administrative
law can continue to provide a meaningful source of constraint on administrative agencies if it is based solely or even primarily on the process
tradition. The synthesis of the twentieth century was a success, certainly in
the sense that it allowed a new form of government to develop without
expressly amending the Constitution or abandoning traditional ideals
associated with the protection of federalism, separation of powers, or
individual rights. That success was dependent, to a significant degree, on a
sense of continuity between the positivist tradition and the process
tradition, and the appearance-most closely associated with the enactment
of the APA-that the process ideal was itself required by positive law. 4
The long-term prospects of an administrative law based solely on
process norms are cause for concern. Unless process norms are themselves
embodied in and enforced as positive law, the authority of any internal
reviewing institution to insist on compliance with those norms is weak.
Those with decisional responsibility will advance arguments favoring confidentiality rather than openness and expedition rather than participation,
and the internal review body cannot respond that these preferences are
contrary to law. Also, the norms associated with the process tradition are
elusive, even more so than those embodied in enacted law. Under pressure
to accomplish discrete policy goals, these norms are likely to give way, or to
morph into novel and more attenuated forms. Perhaps most troubling, the
positivist tradition has been the primary vehicle for preserving an architecture of government that features checks against runaway government
power. It is through the enforcement of enacted law that constitutional
norms associated with federalism, separation of powers, and individual rights
are enforced. It is through interpretation and enforcement of statutes that
States as Children 1-3 (June 15, 2012), http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/sl-exercising[http://perma.cc/CHV8prosecutorial-discretion-individuals-who-came-to-us-as-children.pdf
S4NC] [hereinafter Napolitano Memorandum].
32. See, e.g., Anil Kalhan, Deferred Action, Supervised Enforcement Discretion, and
the Rule of Law Basis for Executive Action on Immigration, 63 UCLA L. Rev. Discourse 58,
65 (2015) (listing "transparency" as rule-of-law value ignored by opposition to President
Obama's immigration actions).
33. See, e.g., id. at 85 (listing "accountability" as rule-of-law value ignored by opposition
to President Obama's immigration actions).
34. Court decisions-including several famous APA decisions-cite public participation,
which is itself a form of both transparency and accountability, as a value the APA encourages.
E.g., United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 E2d 240, 251-53 (2d Cir. 1977).
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Congress's assignment of different functions to different government offices
or to the private sector is maintained. Abandonment of the primary means
of preserving the architecture of government would have far reaching
consequences that are difficult to foresee. Even if every government action is
"transparent," and every government actor is in some theoretical sense
"accountable," individual freedom and local autonomy as we have come to
know them could be irretrievably lost.
The Essay proceeds as follows. Part I describes how administrative law in
the United States evolved to reflect both the original positivist tradition and
a newer process tradition. Part II surveys examples of executive policymaking that moves beyond authority delegated by democratically elected
legislatures-most prominently in the United States the emergence of
presidential administration-and the invocation of the process tradition,
commonly generalized in terms of the norms of transparency and accountability, in an effort to confer legitimacy on these efforts. Part III raises
questions about whether these efforts to legitimize aggressive executive
policymaking in terms of process norms will be successful.
I.

AMERICANJUDICIAL REVIEW AND

THE SYNTHESIS OF TWO TRADITIONS

In order to assess the prospect of an administrative law grounded
solely in the process tradition, it is important to consider how administrative law in the twentieth century came to rest on the twin pillars of
positive law and process review. The story is complex and filled with
many conflicting developments, and it is impossible to present anything
like a complete account in a short essay. It will be necessary to trace only
some broad themes.
In terms of constitutional law, two interpretations of the founding
document were critical in laying the foundation for the administrative
state that emerged in the twentieth century. Both paved the way for a
melding of the older positivist tradition with a newer emphasis on administrative process.
Perhaps the most important constitutional development was the
relaxation of (or more accurately, the continued unwillingness to enforce) the proposition that Congress may not delegate the power to
legislate.15 The Supreme Court held early in the century that there was
no violation of the nondelegation doctrine as long as the legislature laid

35. See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 474-75 (2001)
(observing Court has '"almost never felt qualified to second-guess Congress regarding the
permissible degree of policyjudgment that can be left to those executing or applying the
law" (quoting Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 416 (1989))); Thomas W. Merrill,
Rethinking Article I, Section 1: From Nondelegation to Exclusive Delegation, 104 Colum.
L. Rev. 2097, 2103-09 (2004) [hereinafter Merrill, Rethinking Article I] (discussing history
of nondelegation doctrine).
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down an "intelligible principle" for the government agent to follow. 36 In
the ensuing decades, this evolved into a "boundless standard" satisfied by
even the most vaguely worded or incompletely specified delegations. 7 By
refusing to enforce the nondelegation doctrine, courts gave administrative agencies breathing space to make policy. Significantly, however,
courts also frequently said that one reason such broad delegations were
permissible was because the legislature had made judicial review available
to ensure that the resulting exercises of administrative discretion were
reasonable.3 8 One can readily discern here a partial substitution of
process for positivism. By declining to require the legislature to spell out
in any detail the policies that administrators were to follow, the courts
weakened the positivist tradition. At the same time, the newly developed
requirement of reasoned decisionmaking was advanced as a substitute for
guidance from higher lawmaking authority. The resulting synthesis
combined both traditions-a watered-down positivist tradition and an
emergent process tradition.
The second important constitutional interpretation allowed agencies
rather than courts to exercise primary authority in adjudicating disputes
between individuals and the government. In the nineteenth century, due
process was understood to mean the right to a hearing in a common law
court, subject to narrow exceptions, before one could be deprived of life,
liberty, or property.39 It was also widely presumed that Article III of the
Constitution required that disputes between individuals and the government
40
be resolved by the independent federal courts established by Congress.
The Supreme Court revised these understandings in the early decades of the

36. J.W. Hampton,Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928).
37. See Dep't of Transp. v. Ass'n of Am. R.R.s, 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1246 (2015) (Thomas,
J., concurring in the judgment) ("Although the Court may never have intended the
boundless standard the 'intelligible principle' test has become, it is evident that it does not
adequately reinforce the Constitution's allocation of legislative power." (quoting Whitman,
531 U.S. at 472)); see also Merrill, Rethinking Article I, supra note 35, at 2109 (concluding
nondelegation doctrine "imposes no effective constraint on congressional legislation").
38. See Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the
Administrative State, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 452, 487 (1989) ('"Congress has been willing to
delegate its legislative powers broadly--and the courts have upheld such delegationbecause there is court review to assure that the agency exercises the delegated power within
statutory limits."' (quoting Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 E2d 1, 68 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc)
(Leventhal, J., concurring) (footnote omitted))); Thomas W. Merrill, Delegation and
Judicial Review, 33 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 73, 73 (2010) ("Broad delegations of power to
executive actors are constitutionally permissible, the Court has suggested, in significant part
because courts stand ready to assure citizens that the executive will discharge its discretion in
a...
fashion that otherwise satisfies the requirements of reasoned decision making.").
39. E.g., Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.)
272, 284 (1855).
40. See, e.g., id. ("To avoid misconstruction upon so grave a subject, we think it
proper to state that we do not consider congress can.., withdraw from judicial cognizance any matter which, from its nature, is the subject of a suit at the common law, or in
equity, or admiralty .... ").
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twentieth century.41 The key determination was that due process was satisfied
if a hearing was held before an administrative body that emulated the
features of a common law court, such as a right to present evidence and a
decision based on the evidence presented to the hearing officer.42 Exceptions remained, primarily for matters of private right that would have been
heard by a court at common law.43 But the role of the courts in
administrative matters was increasingly defined as monitoring the process
deployed by administrative adjudicators, rather than resolving disputes
themselves.44 The APA ratified this transformation by directing courts to
uphold findings of '4fact
by administrators if they were supported by
"substantial evidence. 5 Here again we see the substitution of process review
for the enforcement of commands originally thought to be required by the
Constitution-that is, the positivist tradition.
In terms of subconstitutional law, the process tradition emerged in
full flower in the 1970s. The lower courts, led by the D.C. Circuit, openly
espoused the idea that courts should review the process followed by an
agency in developing policy when determining whether a regulatory
initiative was permissible.46 An acceptable process required full disclosure
of the studies and factual assumptions underlying a proposed regulatory
initiative, an opportunity for the public to comment on the studies and
assumptions as well as the policy embodied in a proposed regulation, and
a cogent response by the agency if it rejected material objections raised
by public commenters.4 7 Some judges went so far as to say that courts
should confine themselves to4 reviewing the agency's process and eschew
substantive review altogether. 1

41. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62-63 (1932), is generally regarded as the
watershed decision.
42. See Daniel R. Ernst, Toqueville's Nightmare: The Administrative State Emerges in
America, 1900-1940, at 5 (2014) ("By 1940, the rule of law no longer required that
individuals subject to economic regulation receive a 'day in court' as long as
administrators had given them a 'day in commission."').
43. See N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 89-92 (1982)
(Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment) (finding broad grant of power to bankruptcy
courts unconstitutional as bankruptcy was part of "stuff of the traditional actions at common
law tried by the courts at Westminster in 1789"); see also Wellness Int'l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif,
135 S.Ct. 1932, 1950-60 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (summarizingjurisprudence).
44. Ernst, supra note 42, at 137.
45. 5 U.S.C. § 706(e) (2012).
46. See Antonin Scalia, Vermont Yankee: The APA, the D.C. Circuit, and the Supreme
Court, 1978 Sup. Ct. Rev. 345, 348-52 (summarizing D.C. Circuit development of process
review).
47. See United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 248-53 (2d Cir.
1977) (requiring those procedures for notice-and-comment rulemakings to be adequate
under APA).

48. See David L. Bazelon, Coping with Technology Through the Legal Process, 62
Cornell L. Rev. 817, 823 (1977) (arguing courts should focus on "strengthening
administrative procedures").
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The idea that the full-blown process tradition might be regarded as a
substitute for the positivist tradition was explicated and rationalized in an
important article by Professor Stewart written in 1975."9 Professor Stewart
suggested that the emerging requirements of the process tradition-which
he characterized as a general duty of administrators "to consider adequately all participating interests in decisions on agency policy" 5 0 -could
be viewed as an alternative form of democratic legitimacy. Democracy was
originally conceived as legitimating government because individuals were
allowed to vote for representatives who would then deliberate about what
types of rules backed by coercive force would be made binding on the
citizenry-the "transmission belt" theory of democracy. 51 Professor Stewart
argued that the emerging norm of interest representation could be
regarded as a different mode of democratic legitimacy. The modem
administrative agency, by providing an opportunity to all affected interests
to participate in agency decisionmaking and requiring that agencies
demonstrate that they have given adequate consideration to all interests,
and
"gives citizens a sense of involvement in the process of government,
52
increases confidence in the fairness of government decisions."
Notwithstanding widespread academic endorsement of the process
tradition, judicial decisions continued to reflect both the new process ideal
and the older tradition of positivism. One interesting manifestation of this
has involved the understanding of the APA, itself of course a form of positive
law. One line of decisions has interpreted broad language in the APA as
consistent with what I have called the process tradition. Thus, for example,
the requirement that courts set aside agency action that is "arbitrary and
capricious," originally understood to mean something lacking even a
minimally rational basis, 53 has been used to justify an insistence that agencies
take a "hard look" at critical issues if their actions are to be upheld. 54 The
APA's most general standard of review has thus been transformed into a
demand for reasoned decisionmaking, the hallmark of the process
tradition. "5 Similarly, courts interpreted the bare-bones procedures spelled
out by the APA for informal rulemaking as requiring elaborate disclosure of
the factual and policy rationale for proposed rules, extensive rights of public
comment, and reasoned responses to material comments as part of the

49. Stewart, supra note 6.
50. Id. at 1756.
51. Id. at 1675.
52. Id. at 1761. It should be noted that Stewart himself was skeptical that interest
representation before agencies could be regarded as an acceptable substitute for more
robust forms of democratic legitimacy. See id. at 1802.
53. Pac. States Box & Basket Co. v. White, 296 U.S. 176, 182 (1935) (equating
arbitrary and capricious with mere rationality standard for review of legislation).
54. Greater Bos. Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
55. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971), and Motor
Vehicle Manufacturers Ass'n v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Insurance Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983),
can be regarded as illustrations here.
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"concise general statement of basis and purpose" accompanying the final
rule.5 6 These expansive interpretations of the APA served to legitimize the
emergence of the process tradition. They suggested that process review was
itself required by positive law.
Periodically, however, the Supreme Court has treated the APA like a
set of binding instructions from which no deviation is permitted.57 In
these cases, the positivist tradition has reasserted itself in its original
form, with the APA interpreted as imposing a ceiling on procedural
requirements rather than a floor. It is unclear exactly what triggers these
episodic reversions to a purely positivist mode of analysis in explicating
the APA. What they reveal is that the positivist and proceduralist traditions continue to coexist, however uneasily.
Notwithstanding the continuing tension, the larger picture in the
twentieth century reveals a broad evolution toward a synthesis of the
positive and process traditions. The emergence of the Chevron doctrine 58 as
the dominant form ofjudicial review in the last two decades of the century
is especially revealing in this regard. Chevron's familiar two-step process can
be seen as incorporating the positivist tradition at step one, where courts
are instructed to exercise independent judgment in determining whether
an agency has violated a statutory command. 59 But if the court finds that
the statute is ambiguous or that it does not address the precise question at
issue, then courts are instructed at step two to uphold the agency's interpretation if it is reasonable.6" Several commentators and some lower courts
have urged that "reasonable" in this context should mean reasoned
decisionmaking as defined by the process tradition.6 1 The Supreme Court
has not explicitly endorsed this understanding of step two. But the large
and growing body of decisions applying the Chevron framework reveals a
steady oscillation between measuring agency initiatives against the

56. United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 248-53 (2d Cir.
1977); see alsoJ. Skelly Wright, Courts and the Rulemaking Process: The Limits ofJudicial
Review, 59 Cornell L. Rev. 375, 380-81 (1974) (describing duty of court under APA § 553
as "satisfy[ing] itself that [genuine dialogue between agency experts and concerned
members of the public) occurred and that it was not a sham").
57. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
435 U.S. 519, 524 (1978), is of course the primary example. Last Term's decision in Perez
v. Mortgage Bankers Ass'n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1201 (2015), holding that agencies do not
need to use notice-and-comment procedures in amending interpretative rules, is a more
recent illustration of this line of decisions.
58. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
59. Id. at 842-43.
60. Id. at 843-45.
61. See generally U.S. Telecom Ass'n v. FCC, 227 E3d 450, 460 (D.C. Cir. 2000)
(endorsing "reasoned decisionmaking" approach); Gary S. Lawson, Reconceptualizing
Chevron and Discretion: A Comment on Levin and Rubin, 72 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1377 (1997)
(reviewing literature).
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language of the authorizing statute (positivism) 62 and accepting agency
interpretations that are compatible with statutory language and are developed in standard modes of administrative process (process).63
Even more strikingly, the Court has held that Chevron-style review
applies only when an agency interpretation has the force of law (such as
an interpretation advanced in a binding rule); otherwise, agency interpretations should be considered under what has been called Skidmore
review." This alternative standard of review looks at multiple factors,
including, critically, the persuasiveness of the agency's explanation for its
interpretation.65 Although the fit is not perfect, this can be seen as a
variant type of process review. Relatively formal agency process triggers
strong deference; less formal agency process elicits closer judicial scrutiny into the reasonableness of interpretation. The basic point is that the
Chevron doctrine can be seen as a blending of positivism and process
review, which is the key feature of the grand synthesis achieved by
twentieth century administrative law.
I have emphasized the distinctive character of the positivist and
process traditions, and the transformative nature of the emergence of
process review. But change is often controversial, and consequently it is
not surprising that those who favor new institutional arrangements
frequently insist that they are continuous with established understandings. So it has been in administrative law. A key formulation here is
the use of the concept "rule of law." Although originally associated with
the positivist tradition, the term "rule of law" is sufficiently ambiguous
that proponents of the process tradition have been able to claim that
administrative edicts adopted in a manner consistent with the reasoned
decisionmaking ideal also partake of the "rule of law," without regard to
whether such edicts are securely grounded in any delegation of power.6 6
The term "rule of law" in this context thus serves as a device for
emphasizing (or exaggerating) the continuity in administrative law.
An alternative way of describing the history, which puts more
emphasis on the discontinuity, would be to say that by allowing the
administrative process to satisfy the constitutional requirement of due
process, the Court was taking the first steps toward supplementing the
positivist tradition with the process tradition. A reasonable, that is, a court-

62. See, e.g., MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. AT&T Co., 512 U.S. 218, 225-31 (1994)
(invalidating agency reading of statute as too broad a construction of word "modify").
63. See, e.g., Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. and Research v. United States, 562 U.S. 44,
58-60 (2011) (applying Chevron step-two deference to Treasury regulation adopted
through notice-and-comment procedure).
64. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 234-35 (2001).
65. Id. at 228 (citing Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139-40 (1944)).
66. Ernst, supra note 42, at 2-8 (arguing "rule of law" in America means right to
appeal to common law court and modeling agency process on judicial process therefore
satisfies rule of law).
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like process, was deemed to be equivalent to a hearing by a real court. 67
Whether this comports with the rule of law depends on how one defines
the rule of law.6 8 It clearly represents a substitution, or at least a supplementation, of the process tradition for the positivist tradition, which is the
central feature of the grand synthesis achieved by the twentieth century.
II.

THE RISE OF PRESIDENTIAL ADMINISTRATION
AND THE PROSPECT OF PURE PROCESS

In the early years of the twenty-first century, it is possible to discern a
further turn away from the positivist tradition and in the direction of the
process tradition. It would be misleading to suggest that there has been
anything like a complete displacement of the positivism by process. But
there are increasing signs of movement in this direction.
The movement toward pure process has proceeded furthest in the
European context. The motivating development has been the emergence of
treaty-based systems of multinational regulation, including the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and World Trade Organization , but most
prominently the European Union. The problem posed by these regimes is
that there is no direct delegation of authority from the electorate to the
bodies that exercise primary authority in promulgating directives having the
force of law.69 In the context of the European Union, legislative proposals
are initiated by a Commission, whose members are appointed by the heads
of the governments that participate in the regime.7 ° Most legislation must
gain the assent of the European Parliament, which is directly elected, and
the Council of Ministers, which consists of representatives from the member
governments, but the Commission is the driving force.7 The Commission
also oversees an extensive bureaucracy, which promulgates secondary
legislation (regulations) and engages in enforcement activity. From a
positivist perspective, the Commission and its bureaucracy are themselves
67. See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 53 (1932) (permitting administrative agencies
to determine questions of fact subject to deferential review by courts). For antecedents,
see Merrill, Article III, supra note 12, at 955-72 (describing historical development of
deferential review of agency factfinding).
68. For a recent attempt, see Dep't of Transp. v. Ass'n of Am. R.R.s, 135 S. Ct. 1225,
1242 (2015) (ThomasJ., concurring in the judgment) (suggesting rule of law requires that
"ruler must be subject to the law in exercising his power and may not govern by will
alone"). For one source of Justice Thomas's inspiration, which places more emphasis on
the need for independent judicial review, see Philip Hamburger, Is Administrative Law
Unlawful? 143-48 (2014) (arguing judicial independence was central to development of
modern rule of law).
69. See Nat. Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 464 F.3d 1, 7-10 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (holding that
action by Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) cannot be reviewed for compliance with
norms established by international treaty organization because such norms are not "law"
within meaning of U.S. domestic law).
70. David Edward & Robert Lane, Edward and Lane on European Union Law 96,
100-01 (2013).
71. Id. at 105-06.

2015]

PRESIDENTIAL ADMINISTRATION

1967

agents appointed pursuant to treaty provisions ratified by the member
governments; as such, they represent a further extension of the administrative model, rather than a consolidation of the democratic sovereignty
model. To borrow Professor Stewart's metaphor, the transmission belt has
been stretched, not widened. 7 All of which has given rise to widespread
concern that the E.U. regime suffers from a "democracy deficit."73
In this context, scholars sympathetic to a strong European Union have
responded creatively by invoking what I have called the process tradition as
an alternative source of legitimacy for the directives of the European
74
Commission. They have not borrowed American terms, like "hard look"
or "reasoned decisionmaking," 75 which emerged from the efforts of
federal judges to meld the process tradition to the language of the APA.
Instead, they have developed their own vocabulary, invoking the concepts
of "transparency" and "accountability" (sometimes also "participation") to
describe the features of administrative regulation that partake of enhanced
legitimacy.76 These concepts are slippery (no less than "hard look" or
"reasoned decisionmaking"), but in most applications they track the
features of the process tradition that developed in the United States and
reached its full form in the 1970s. A regulation is "transparent" if its terms
are fully spelled out in a publicly accessible text and if the regulatory body
77
provides a comprehensive rationale for the provisions of the regulation.
The regulators are "accountable" if members of the public are allowed to
participate in some fashion in the development of the regulations and the
regulatory body responds to concerns raised by these participants in some
meaningful fashion, or if the regulators are subject to review or oversight
by some institution such as a national court that has a stronger claim to

72. Stewart, supra note 6, at 1675.
73. See, e.g., Paul Craig, Integration, Democracy, and Legitimacy 28-31, in The
Evolution of EU Law (Paul Craig & Grainne De Burca eds., 2d ed. 2011) (summarizing
debate over Europe's democracy deficit).
74. See Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The Real World of Arbitrariness Review,
75 U. Chi. L. Rev. 761, 761-63 (2008) (discussing development of hard-look doctrine).
75. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 52
(1983) (disallowing agency action as not being product of "reasoned decisionmaking").
76. See, e.g., E. Madalina Busuioc, European Agencies: Law and Practices of
Accountability 9 (2013) (offering systematic survey of "accountability regimes of European
agencies"); Paul Craig & Grainne De Burca, EU Law: Text, Cases, and Materials 541-49
(5th ed. 2011) (surveying origins and development of transparency as general principle of
E.U. law).
77. See, e.g., P. Nikiforos Diamandouros, European Ombudsman, Transparency,
Accountability, and Democracy in the EU, Lecture at the School of Advanced
International Studies of Johns Hopkins University, Bologna, Italy (Oct. 17, 2006),
http://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/speeches/en/2006-10-17b.htm
[http://perma.cc/2HN6UT8M] (positing public accessibility to information is necessary for transparency);
Transparency Portal, European Comm'n, http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/index-en.htm
[http://perma.cc/T34Z-8RN2] (last updated July 9, 2015) (explaining European citizens
have "right" to access E.U. rules and decisions).
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democratic legitimacy.7 8 In urging regulators to make their regulations
"transparent" and to hold themselves "accountable," these scholars are in
effect replicating what Stewart called the "interest representation" model
of democratic legitimacy in the United States in the 1970s-that is, the
process tradition. 79 The difference being that in the multinational regime
8
context, the process tradition is the only game in town. 1
American administrative law has not yet begun to approach the situation of the European Union, but there are intimations that it is headed
in that direction. As originally conceived, and throughout most of the
nineteenth century, Congress was the dominant institution in the
American system of government.81 By the end of the twentieth century
and accelerating at the beginning of the twenty-first, the President and
the vastly expanded executive branch have become the most powerful
engine of government. 2 Presidential influence over policy has gone far
beyond proposing and vetoing legislation. 3 Presidents have worked
assiduously to increase their control over the executive branch and independent agencies, and have used this control to engage in what has been
called "presidential administration." 4 Under this conception, the
President and his staff develop a comprehensive policy agenda designed

78. See, e.g., Elizabeth Fisher, The European Union in the Age of Accountability, 24
OxfordJ. Legal Stud. 495, 514 (2004) (book review) (noting "promotion of accountability
in the EU cannot be disentangled from debates about the legitimacy of European
governance and in particular what the role of democratic processes and principles should
be"); Diamandouros, supra note 77 (defining accountability as having "to explain and
justify one's actions in terms of appropriate criteria and in sufficient detail").
79. See Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Epilogue to Law and New Governance
in the EU and the US 402 (Grainne de Burca & Joanne Scott eds., 2006) (noting
legitimacy of peer review processes of legislation promulgated by European Union "will
depend on their transparency and more ambitiously, on their openness to directly
deliberative participation by affected stakeholders").
80. Or at least has been perceived to the only game in by many students of the
European Union. As Professor Peter Lindseth has argued, the fact that the application of
E.U. directives in particular cases is often reviewable in national courts may provide a
critical link between European edicts and conventional conceptions of sovereignty that
accounts in significant part for national acceptance (up to a point) of the European
enterprise. Peter L. Lindseth, Power and Legitimacy: Reconciling Europe and the NationState 4-57 (2010).
81. Woodrow Wilson, Congressional Government 11 (1885), http://galenet.gale
group.com/servlet/MOML?af=RN&ae=F102655835&srchtp=a&ste=14
(on file with the
Columbia Law Review).
82. See, e.g., Posner & Vermeule, supra note 29, at 5-7 (noting modern expansion
and size of executive branch and its power over agency policymaking).
83. See, e.g., id. at 11 (describing executive control over policy agenda); Johnson
Memorandum, supra note 28 (laying out comprehensive federal nondeportation policy
for certain types of illegal immigrants).
84. E.g., Kagan, supra note 4, at 2246 ("We live today in an era of presidential
administration.").
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to maintain popular support and ensure reelection.8 5 The President's
agenda is then promoted by issuing "directives" to administrative agencies
to implement items on the agenda, all the while seeking to rally public
opinion with presidential speeches and press conferences, weekly radio
addresses, and photo opportunities.8 6 Congress, meanwhile, stymied by
ponderous procedures and afflicted with partisan gridlock, is relegated to
a largely reactive role, holding oversight hearings, occasionally ratifying
presidential initiatives with legislation, 8 and
periodically trimming
7
presidential sails with appropriations riders.
The most extreme analysis of the emergence of presidential administration, by Professors Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule, argues that the
President and the administration are no longer meaningfully constrained by
law. 8 This is almost surely an overstatement. If Presidents are unconstrained
by law, it is unclear why they always seek to justify their actions as being
consistent with law, threaten to veto legislation they do not like, and obey
judgments of courts based on judicial interpretations of the law." Given
their analysis, however, it is unsurprising that Professors Posner and
Vermeule put no stock in the positivist tradition in administrative law. They
have no interest in the process tradition either, viewing the APA and related
process restraints as filled with "black holes" and "gray holes" that allow
administrative agencies to dispense with procedural requirements whenever
they become inconvenient."0 Instead, they argue that Presidents are
constrained only by politics and public opinion. In particular, Presidents
need "to maintain popularity and credibility" in order to govern effectively. 1
Since this is the only truly meaningful constraint on presidential action,
administrative law is an irrelevancy that can be dispensed with.
Few, if any, of the other partisans of presidential administration
would go so far. Instead, mainstream lawyers and scholars tend to defend
presidential administration in terms of the process tradition. Three

85. Id. at 2345 (noting presidential administration drives "broad domestic policy
agenda").
86. Id. at 2290-99 (discussing Clinton White House's usage of directives).
87. Id. at 2256 (noting Congress's failure to "exercise any effective control over
administrative policymaking" and instead only using weak methods of administrative
control); see also Michael S. Greve & Ashley C. Parrish, Administrative Law Without
Congress, 22 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 501, 502-03 (2015) (attributing "powerful shift in the
direction of executive government" to "debilities of the United States Congress").
88. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 29, at 31-37.
89. See Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Goldilocks Executive, 90
Tex. L. Rev. 973, 988-92 (2012) (reviewing Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, The
Executive Unbound: After the Madisonian Republic (2010)) (asserting President is not
"unbound from the laws of Congress" or courtjudgments).
90. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 29, at 92-101. Although Professors Posner and
Vermeule have no truck with process review, it is interesting that they recommend that
Presidents "commit to transparency" about the actions they take in order to enhance their
credibility with the public, id. at 145, an echo of the European version of the process tradition.
91. Id. at 13.
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examples can be cited in support of this proposition, although others
could be cited as well.
Perhaps the most significant manifestation of the turn toward
presidential administration is the emergence of systematic White House
review of major agency regulations. The instrument for this review is an
entity known as the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs
(OIRA), located in the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), which
is part of the Executive Office of the President (EOP) .92 Although there
were precursors during the administrations of Presidents Gerald Ford
and Jimmy Carter, the major impetus for systematic review of regulations
came during the Reagan Administration." Based on an executive order,
OIRA was charged with determining, "to the extent permitted by law,"
whether regulations issued by executive departments would deliver social
benefits in excess of their costs.94 The regulatory hook for such review
was the asserted authority of OMB to act as gatekeeper in permitting the
publication of regulations in the Federal Register.95 Because the regulatory review process was located in the EOP, its determinations were
assumed to be immune from judicial review under the APA.96
The OIRA review process has no clear statutory foundation and thus
sits on shaky ground from thrperspective of the positivist tradition.9 7 It
also is conducted largely in secret, with no opportunity for formal
participation by affected interests,9" and therefore runs counter to the
norms associated with the judicially developed process tradition.
Regulatory review was lambasted by critics on both grounds during its early
deregulatory orientation in the Reagan Administration.9 9 During the Bush
92. Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs, White House,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/oira [https://perma.cc/PJT9-VPNH] (last visited Aug.
8,2015).
93. See, e.g., Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State,
62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 3 (1995) (noting most important development came from President
Ronald Reagan's executive order).
94. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127, 128 (1982), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601
(1988), revoked by Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1993), reprinted as amended in
5 U.S.C. § 691 (2012).
95. Id. § 3(f) (2), at 130.
96. See, e.g., Peter Ketcham-Colwill, Presidential Influence over Agency Rulemaking
Through Regulatory Review, 82 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1622, 1635 (2014) (noting OIRA's
immunity from APA); Michael A. Livermore & Richard L. Revesz, Regulatory Review,
Capture, and Agency Inaction, 101 Geo. L.J. 1337, 1339 (2013) (emphasizing OIRA
actions are not subject to judicial review).
97. The only legal authority cited in the original Reagan executive order was "the
authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and laws of the United States of
America." Exec. Order No. 12,291, supra note 94.
98. See Pildes & Sunstein, supra note 93, at 5 (discussing criticism of OIRA review as
being too secretive).
99. See, e.g., Alan B. Morrison, OMB Interference with Agency Rulemaking: The
Wrong Way to Write a Regulation, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 1059, 1067-68 (1986) (criticizing OIRA
review as unaccountable and secretive); Erik D. Olson, The Quiet Shift of Power: Office of
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I Administration, legislative hostility to regulatory review forced a transfer
of its function to the Office of the Vice President. With the election of
President Bill Clinton, a Democrat more sympathetic to activist regulation,
many assumed that the office would be abolished.' Instead, President
Clinton issued a new executive order, reestablishing the office and
relocating it in OMB.'' The Clinton version of regulatory oversight was
less explicitly deregulatory. It also included procedural reforms designed
to limit ex parte contacts during the review process and to provide for
more disclosure of communications between OIRA and the agencies
whose regulations were under review.0 2 This newer, softer version of
regulatory review encountered little opposition from Congress or from
legal academics. 03 Perpetuation of the office by President George W.
Bush0 4 and President Obama'0 5 appears to have cemented its existence as
a permanent fixture of the regulatory state.
Notwithstanding bipartisan acceptance of OIRA review, it represents
a highly discordant feature within the American administrative process.
The review process rests on a series of executive orders, not on legislation
enacted by Congress delegating authority to the President to engage in
such review.' 6 And it proceeds largely behind closed doors, lacking any
of the features of public participation or judicial review. 7
In order to legitimize the office, it was necessary to draw on the
process tradition in a newly creative way. Then-Professor Elena Kagan, who
served as an advisor in the Clinton White House and is now a Supreme
CourtJustice, provided the principal justification. In a major article in the
Harvard Law Review, she argued that presidential administration
"enhances transparency," because the high visibility of presidential
pronouncements and press releases about regulatory affairs enables the
Management & Budget Supervision of Environmental Protection Agency Rulemaking
Under Executive Order 12,291, 4 Va. J. Nat. Resources L. 1, 3 (1984) (mentioning
"simmering controversy over whether, and under what conditions, the President has the
(legal] authority to supervise executive agency rulemaking").
100. See Bruce Ackerman, The Decline and Fall of the American Republic 35 (2013)
(noting with Democrats' return to power in 1992 "one might have expected them to call
upon President Clinton to abolish OIRA").
101. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.FR. 638 (1994), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. §
601 (2012) (supplemented by Exec. Order No. 13,563, 3 C.F.R. 215 (2012), reprinted in 5
U.S.C. § 601 (2012)).
102. Kagan, supra note 4, at 2286-87.
103. See Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory
State, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 1260, 1267 (2006) (claiming appropriateness of OIRA review is
not seriously challenged).
104. Exec. Order No. 13,422, 3 C.F.R. 191 (2008) (modifying and amending Executive
Order 12,866); Exec. Order No. 13,258, 3 C.ER. § 204 (2003) (same).
105. Exec. Order No. 13,497, 3 C.F.R. § 218 (2010) (revoking Executive Orders 13,258
and 13,422).
106. See supra notes 101 and 104-105 (noting executive orders creating OIRA).
107. See Pildes & Sunstein, supra note 93, at 5 (discussing secretive nature of OIRA
review).
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public "to comprehend more accurately the sources and nature of bureaucratic power."' 08 And presidential directives "promote[] accountability,"
because the President is the only official "elected by a national constituency in votes focused on general, rather than local, policy issues." ' 9
When directed and reviewed by the President, bureaucratic action "thus
turns out to have a democratic pedigree purer even than Congress's in our
system of government." 110
Here we see the process tradition, as reformulated by European
scholars in terms of the norms of accountability and transparency, being
used to justify administrative action having a weak or nonexistent
foundation when viewed from the perspective of positivism. The transformation is starting, given the longstanding understanding, grounded in
positivist theory, that the President is not a "lawmaker.""' Not everyone
agrees with then-Professor Kagan's defense of OIRA review in terms of the
superior transparency and accountability associated with the EOP. Others
continue to fault the process for its lack of openness and public participation.'
It is a sign of the times, however, that criticism of OIRA is
centered on whether it conforms to the norms of the process traditiontransparency and accountability. No one seems to care that it operates
without any delegation of authority from Congress.
More recently, presidential administration has moved beyond regulatory review to occupy new territory. The next example involves action,
again directed by the EOP, which has been labeled "big waiver" in a
recent article by Professors David Barron and Todd Rakoff." 3 The
authors note that divided government and legislative gridlock have led to
increased invocation by the executive branch of waivers of requirements
imposed by Congress in statutes such as the No Child Left Behind Act
and the ACA. 114 They do not claim that the executive has inherent
authority to waive requirements imposed by law. A decision to make
modifications in regulatory law through the use of waivers "depends on

108. Kagan, supra note 4, at 2331-32.
109. Id. at 2331, 2334.
110. Id. at 2334. Then-Professor Kagan credited Professor Jerry Mashaw for developing
the argument that regulations adopted by administrative agencies have a superior claim to
democratic legitimacy because of oversight by the nationally elected and accountable
President. See Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political
Decisions, 1J.L. Econ. & Org. 81, 95 (1985).
111. E.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952).
112. See, e.g., Nina A. Mendelson, Disclosing "Political" Oversight of Agency Decision
Making, 108 Mich. L. Rev. 1127, 1165 (2010) (urging more disclosure of executive
supervision of agencies); Peter M. Shane, Political Accountability in a System of Checks
and Balances: The Case of Presidential Review of Rulemaking, 48 Ark. L. Rev. 161, 207-09
(1995) (noting criticism of process based on lack of transparency).
113. DavidJ. Barron & Todd D. Rakoff, In Defense of Big Waiver, 113 Colum. L. Rev.
265, 272 (2013).
114. Id. at 267-68.
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there being a distinct statutory waiver authority.""' 5 Nevertheless, the
authors devote little attention to the question whether the waivers they
deem "big" were actually authorized by the relevant legislation. To the
contrary, they seem comfortable with aggressive invocations of broadly
worded or ambiguous waiver authority in order to achieve an "effective,
engaged, and democratically responsive administrative state" that is not
"hemmed in by federal legislative baselines enacted decades ago.""16 In
lieu of proposing that Congress spell out the terms of permissible waivers
in greater detail, they suggest a heightened obligation on the part of
agencies to explain their decision to waive a statute. This is prudent, they
counsel, because exercises of big waiver will "generate[] headlines," and
"critics will seize upon weaknesses in the legal arguments.""' 7 Thus,
"[t] he agency should explain why its big waiver is not just permissible but
affirmatively desirable; it should explain, that is, why the purpose of the
statute will, under existing circumstances, be better satisfied by departure
from the specific rules of the statute."" 8 By "forcing transparency" ' 1 9 in
this fashion, decisions to engage in big waiver, the authors argue, will have
enhanced legitimacy in the eyes of the public.
The authors' celebration of "big waiver," technically exercised by
agencies but directed by the White House, reflects a further subordination of the positivist tradition, with a concomitant elevation of elements of the process tradition in its place. The authors gloss over the fact
that executive waivers of statutory requirements will rarely be subject to
judicial review. 2 ' This is because those most directly affected by a waiver
will be relieved of a statutory burden and cannot claim to be adversely
affected or aggrieved. Meanwhile, the beneficiaries of the waived
provision presumably represent a diffuse general interest of the sort that
typically does not support a claim of standing under the Court's standing
jurisprudence.' 2 Accordingly, even if the executive branch determines to
waive statutory requirements in a "transparent" way, as urged by the
authors, the accountability of the executive for such actions will ordinarily rest on the factors invoked by then-Professor Kagan in support of
115. Id. at 312.
116. Id. at 310.
117. Id. at 319.
118. Id. at 332.
119. Id. at 334.
120. The authors allude to "the special standing issues that may arise as to some
exercises of the waiver power," id. at 319, but say these "warrant an article in their own
right." Id. at 319 n.201. As Professors Michael Greve and Ashley Parrish document, the
D.C. Circuit has adopted an especially restrictive approach to standing in cases involving
challenges to agency waivers. Greve & Parrish, supra note 87, at 539-43.
121. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 755 (1984) (stating individuals have "no
standing to complain simply that their Government is violating the law"); see also FEC v.
Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 23-25 (1998) (summarizing decisional law holding that generalized
grievances do not confer standing); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 173-74
(1974) (holding generalized grievance did not confer standing).
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other unreviewable presidential directives-general public support for
the incumbent President and his or her prospects for reelection.
The final example concerns efforts by the Obama Administration to
achieve major reform of the immigration system by unilateral executive
action. In 2012, the Department of Homeland Security announced by
public memorandum a program called Deferred Action for Childhood
Arrivals (DACA) . 122 Under this program, unauthorized immigrants who
had entered the United States before the age of sixteen and had been
present continuously for five years were entitled to renewable two-year
relief from removal (later expanded to three years), 123 as well as authorization to work in the United States. 124 In November 2014, shortly after
mid-term elections in which the President's party lost control of both
Houses of Congress, President Obama announced a program called
Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent
Residents (DAPA) .125 Under this program, unauthorized immigrants who
were parents of children born in the United States or otherwise lawfully
present were authorized to apply for deferral of removal and work
permits for three years, provided they could show that they were not
"enforcement priorities" (i.e., subject to criminal prosecution or identified as national security risks) .126
These executive actions were justified on the ground that they were
exercises in prosecutorial discretion. 127 Traditionally, prosecutorial discretion has been exercised by local prosecutors making highly contextual
judgments based on multiple factors, such as the strength of the
evidence, the culpability of the offender, and the available prosecutorial
resources.1 2 8 Advocates of the process tradition in administrative law have
long urged that prosecutorial discretion should be cabined by regulations or written guidelines that would provide a publicly articulated
rule to structure such decisions. 29 The Obama Administration's immigration directives appear to reflect such a development, although the

122. Napolitano Memorandum, supra note 31, at 3.
123. Johnson Memorandum, supra note 28, at 3.
124. Napolitano Memorandum, supra note 31, at 3.
125. Johnson Memorandum, supra note 28, at 4-5.
126. Id. at 3.
127. Id. at 1; Napolitano Memorandum, supra note 31, at 1. Exercises of prosecutorial
discretion are generally unreviewable. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985) ("This
Court has recognized on several occasions ...that an agency's decision not to prosecute
or enforce ... is a decision generally committed to an agency's absolute discretion.").
128. See Inmates of Attica Corr. Facility v. Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375, 380 (2d. Cir.
1973) (noting general judicial reluctance to cabin prosecutorial discretion given
complexity of deciding whether to prosecute).
129. See, e.g., Kenneth Culp Davis, Discretionary Justice: A Preliminary Inquiry 22325 (1969) (advocating promulgation of rules to constrain prosecutorial discretion).
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Administration also insists that individual immigration judges retain
discretion to depart from the directives in individual cases. 130
A recent article by Professors Adam Cox and Cristina Rodriguez
justifying these exercises in executive reform of immigration law again
suggests a further evolution away from positivism toward the process
tradition.' 3' One part of their argument consists of the claim that the
President enjoys a heightened degree of autonomous authority in the
field of immigration. Based on a survey of the history of immigration law,
they argue that executive power in this area rests not only on express
delegations of power from Congress, as the positivist tradition would
require, but also on what they call "de facto delegation."'' 32 These de
facto delegations are based on a variety of unilateral actions by Presidents
to permit entry of immigrants for humanitarian or foreign policy reasons
that were then either ratified or acquiesced in by Congress. 133 A second
part of the argument is that the executive reforms are a worthy
innovation because they make "the exercise of discretion more rule-like,
more centralized, and more transparent."'' 4 In other words, executive
revision of the immigration laws earns plaudits under the norms
associated with the process tradition. Indeed, the only criticism of the
executive reforms offered by the authors is that "the process that
produced them was opaque." 135 The policies "might have benefitted from
more procedural formality" like the notice-and-comment provisions of
the APA. 136 "The public deliberation facilitated by the proceduralist APA
can increase the accountability of the policymaking process while also

130. The 2014 policy has been stayed by order of the federal district court in the
Southern District of Texas, on the ground that it is in substance a legislative rule that must
be promulgated by notice-and-comment procedures. Texas v. United States, No. B-14-254,
2015 WL 648579 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 16, 2015). The Fifth Circuit declined to lift the stay, 787
F.3d 733, 743 (5th Cir. 2015), and the matter is now on appeal. Key questions are whether
the states challenging the policy have standing, and whether the guidelines are really a
disguised legislative rule. General statements of policy, under the APA, do not have to be
promulgated by notice-and-comment rulemaking. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (A) (2012).
131. Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodriguez, The President and Immigration Law Redux,
125 Yale L.J. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 4) (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
[hereinafter Cox & Rodriguez, Redux]. The article builds on and updates an earlier piece by
the same authors, entitled The President and Immigration Law, 119 Yale L.J. 458 (2009)
[hereinafter Cox & Rodriguez, President and Immigration Law].
132. Cox & Rodriguez, Redux, supra note 131 (manuscript at 3) ("The intersection of
the immigration code and on-the-ground enforcement realities has given rise, on a large
scale, to what we have termed the 'de facto delegation' of immigration screening authority
to the President" (quoting Cox & Rodriguez, President and Immigration Law, supra note
131, at 512)).
133. Id. (manuscript at 13) (discussing programs used by former Presidents to extend
relief for humanitarian or foreign policy reasons).
134. Id. (manuscript at 3).
135. Id. (manuscript at 62).
136. Id.
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bolstering public confidence in the measures ultimately adopted."' 137
Thus, like then-Professor Kagan and Professors Barron and Rakoff before
them, the authors envision an enhanced sphere of presidential autonomy largely free of constraints grounded in positive law and justify the
legitimacy of policymaking within this sphere based on executive adher138
ence to process norms.
There are several common themes among the three examples just
surveyed. One is that they all represent an expansion of presidential
power, rather than of traditional administrative agency authority. An
executive department may be the instrument by which the policy
initiative is implemented, but the decision to act comes from the White
House. We are witnessing an aggrandizement of power by the Second
Branch, not some expansion of authority by a mysterious Fourth Branch.
A second is that the path of expansion follows various routes where
action is likely to be immune from judicial review. Regulatory review
escapes judicial scrutiny because OIRA is part of the EOP, which is not
subject to the APA. 3 9 Big waiver escapes review because the interests
harmed by such action are diffuse general interests that lack standing to
complain in court. 4 ' And reform of immigration law by executive order
escapes review (if traditional doctrine is followed) because decisions not
to prosecute are not subject to judicial review.' 4' Like water flowing
downhill in different channels, power expands where it meets no check
from other sources of authority.
More fundamentally, we see in each of the examples a further
evisceration of the positivist tradition. Regulatory review by OIRA has only
the most gossamer foundation in enacted law-OMB's asserted authority
to control the timing of release of regulations for publication in the
Federal Register.'42 Big waiver is said by its celebrants to require statutory
waiver authority,'43 but in the absence of judicial review, there is little
constraint on waivers of statutory requirements, and in some instances
involving waivers of requirements under the ACA no such authority

137. Id.
138. For the argument that the President lacks constitutional authority to make broad
dispensations that prospectively excuse legal violations, see Zachary S. Price, Enforcement
Discretion and Executive Duty, 67 Vand. L. Rev. 671, 688 (2014).
139. See supra note 96 and accompanying text (explaining regulatory review process's
location in EOP led to belief it was immune from judicial review under APA).
140. See supra notes 120-121 and accompanying text (noting executive waivers of
statutory requirements are rarely subject to judicial review).

141. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985) ("This Court has recognized on
several occasions ... that an agency's decision not to prosecute or enforce ... is a decision
generally committed to an agency's absolute discretion.").
142. See supra note 97 and accompanying text (noting lack of statutory foundation in
OIRA review process makes it infirm from positivist perspective).

143. Barron & Rakoff, supra note 113, at 335 ("[T]o waive any, or at least major,
substantive statutory provisions, there has to be explicit statutory authority.").

2015]

PRESIDENTIAL ADMINISTRATION

1977

appears to exist. 1" Lastly, the reform of immigration law by executive
order has emerged in a form that closely tracks legislation proposed in
Congress that Congress has failed to enact. 45 Cumulatively, these examples
present the prospect of a revision of the constitutional order in which the
President exercises autonomous policymaking authority without the need
for any delegation of power from Congress, at least for the duration of the
presidential administration.
Finally, we see in each of the examples an effort to legitimize the
exercise of unilateral presidential power by invoking the norms of the
process tradition. The most conventional move here is to emphasize the
ways in which presidential policymaking has voluntarily adopted norms of
openness, publication, and advance notification, i.e., "transparency," and
hence can be said to comport with the "rule of law" in the most minimal
sense. 14 6 Commentators have urged the executive to offer more complete
explanations for its initiatives,' 4 7 and there has been some effort along
these lines, as in the Obama Administration's release of the legal analysis of
the OLC justifying the DAPA order.14 Entreaties to adopt some form of
public participation, in the form of the APA's notice-and-comment
requirement, while popular with commentators, 149 have largely fallen on
deaf ears within the administration. The most creative effort is thenProfessor Kagan's argument that presidential speeches and press releases
satisfy the requirement of transparency, and presidential elections ensure
accountability, and hence unilateral presidential policymaking is consistent
with the process tradition, broadly conceived. 50 Whether future commentators will adopt these arguments to support initiatives like big waiver and
reform by executive order remains to be seen.

III. WHY PURE PROCESS REVIEW WILL NOT WORK
The key question I wish to raise is whether an administrative law
divorced from positivism and based solely on the process tradition will
144. See Nicholas Bagley, The Legality of Delaying Key Elements of the ACA, 370 New
Eng. J. Med. 1967, 1969 (2014) (arguing postponing entire sections of ACA had no
statutory justification and exceeded President's authority to enforce law).
145. See, e.g., Lauren Gilbert, Obama's Ruby Slippers: Enforcement Discretion in the
Absence of Immigration Reform, 116 W. Va. L. Rev. 255, 267-74 (2013) (noting
similarities between DACA and DREAM Act).
146. E.g., Kalhan, supra note 32, at 65.
147. See, e.g., Barron & Rakoff, supra note 113, at 327 ("A fundamental requirement
of administrative law.., is the agency's duty to explain the decisions it makes.").
148. Memorandum from Karl R. Thompson, Principal Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen.,
Office of Legal Counsel to the Sec'y of Homeland Sec. & the Counsel to the President,
The Dep't of Homeland Security's Authority to Prioritize Removal of Certain Aliens
Unlawfully Present in the United States and to Defer Removal of Others (Nov. 19, 2014),
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/opinions/attachments/2014/11/20/201411-19-authorize-removal.pdf[http://perma.cc/L5DR-ZZG7].
149. See Cox & Rodriguez, Redux, supra note 131, at 62.
150. Kagan, supra note 4, at 2331-32.
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work in the long run. Can it meaningfully preserve the understanding
that we live under a republican form of government subject to checks
and balances? Can it preserve the values of stability, predictability, and
equal treatment that we associate with the rule of law (however slippery
that term may be)? We know that the positivist tradition can serve these
ends. Whenever courts review governmental action for compliance with
the Constitution or administrative action for compliance with a statute,
they are reaffirming the supremacy of law ratified by the people or
enacted by the people's representatives, and they do so in a fashion
designed to preserve stability of expectations about the meaning of these
constraints. 151 We also know that the grand synthesis in administrative law
developed in the twentieth century, which relied on a blending of
positivism and process review, can serve these ends. Although courts
supplemented a concern for fidelity to democratically enacted law with a
concern for the process in which agencies acted, the process norms they
developed were designed to facilitate public participation and understanding, and courts endeavored to link these process norms to forms of
enacted law.152 The question is whether we can expect similar results
from presidential administration, in which the sole form of administrative law is an internally enforced commitment to the norms
associated with the process tradition.15
It is difficult to disentangle questions about the prospect of pure
process review from the availability of judicial review. At least in the
American context, the intimations of pure process review surveyed in the
last Part all arise in contexts where executive action is or is assumed to be
immune from judicial review. 54 Where judicial review is available,
something like the grand synthesis will persevere, at least for the foreseeable future. Indeed, in the realm of judicial review, the positivist
tradition-as manifested today most typically under step one of the
Chevron doctrine-has become, if anything, more dominant than process
review. 155 But not all governmental policy is subject to judicial review.15 6 It
is not difficult to imagine that future Presidents will continue to exploit
the gaps where judicial review is not available and, building on these
gaps, will seek to expand on presidential administration in ways perhaps

151. See supra notes 5-8 and accompanying text (describing positivist tradition).
152. See supra Part I (describing grand synthesis).
153. Kagan, supra note 4, at 2384 (answering question in affirmative).
154. See supra notes 107, 127 and accompanying text (discussing immunity from
judicial review).
155. It is also reflected in a number of other judicial trends, such as the rise of
textualism in statutory interpretation, the decline of federal common law, and the judicial
hostility to implied private rights of action.
156. See, e.g., supra note. 107 and accompanying text (discussing OIRA immunity
from judicial review).
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not presently imaginable.'57 And it is likely that efforts to square these
initiatives with the rule of law will be expressed largely if not exclusively
in terms of the process tradition.
The very idea of presidential administration is deeply problematic.
Professor Strauss, for one, has long been skeptical of the idea that the
President, without regard to any delegation from Congress of authority
to perform such a role, is a "decider" rather than an "overseer" of the
administrative state.15 Like Congress and the judiciary, he has observed,
the President is a "they," not an "it." 1 59 The EOP is itself a bureaucracy,

superimposed on top of a much larger federal bureaucracy. Largely
immune from judicial review, its functions are more political and much
more weakly defined by legislation than those of the typical executive
department or independent regulatory agency 60 As Professor Strauss has
argued, it is appropriate that the EOP perform a supervisory and
coordinating role-recommending budgetary appropriations, reminding
agencies that they should exercise their discretion in ways that maximize
aggregate social welfare, resolving policy disputes among agencies with
overlapping authority, and acting as a constraint against excessive paperwork burdens on citizens. 16' But to allow the EOP to displace the myriad
agencies by becoming the "decider" would weaken legal constraints on

157. For one possible harbinger of things to come, consider the proposal to create an
office within the White House that would set guidelines for discretionary enforcement
authority across the entire administrative state. Kate Andrias, The President's Enforcement
Power, 88 NYU. L. Rev. 1031, 1037-38 (2013). The central argument, predictably, is that
centralization of enforcement power in this fashion would make the current system of
prosecutorial discretion, which is "ad hoc, crisis driven, and frequently opaque," much
more transparent and accountable. Id. at 1031.
158. See Peter L. Strauss, Foreword: Overseer, or "The Decider"? The President in
Administrative Law, 75 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 696, 704-05 (2007) [hereinafter Strauss,
Overseer] ("[W]here Congress has assigned a function to a named agency subject to its
oversight and the discipline of judicial review, the President's role-like that of the
Congress and the courts-is that of overseer and not decider.").
159. See id. at 753-54 (discussing how presidential decisions are made by numerous,
nonelected officials); see also id. at 715 (citing Lisa Schultz Bressman & Michael P.
Vandenbergh, Inside the Administrative State: A Critical Look at the Practice of
Presidential Control, 105 Mich. L. Rev. 47, 49-50, 68 (2006)) (noting study documenting
that EPA received guidance from nineteen different White House offices which was often
"conflicting" and "cacophonous"); cf. Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a They, Not
an It:
Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, 12 Int'l Rev. L. & Econ. 239, 248 (1992) (originating
"they" versus "it" distinction in context of Congress).
160. Cf. Peter L. Strauss, The President and the Constitution, 65 Case W. Res. L. Rev.
1151, 1163 (2015) ("The Executive Office of the Presidency has grown from a handful of
officials tolerated by Congress ... to hundreds of bureaucrats acting as intermediaries
between President and agency, with 'czars' responsible for major policy concerns acting
outside public administrative procedures and shielded by White House prerogatives from
public view.").
161. See Strauss, Overseer, supra note 158, at 709 (noting President should only have
"supervisory, not decisional, authority").
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from
administrative action, and deprive affected interests and individuals 162
policy.
regulatory
of
implementation
the
in
voice
having an effective
More fundamentally, presidential administration undermines the role
of Congress in allocating power among governmental institutions. Only
Congress, under the Supremacy Clause and the Necessary and Proper
Clause, has authority "to arrang[e], order[], and distribut[e] power to act
with the force of law among different institutions in society"-"to decide
who decides.'I 63 In contrast, "[t]he President has no inherent authority to
make law, create institutions, set appropriation levels, or allocate enforcement authority among rival institutions." ' 6 4 The attempts by recent
Presidents to occupy policy space not delegated to the White House by
Congress are thus inconsistent with a fundamental design principle
reflected in our evolved constitutional order.
To be sure, as Professors Posner and Vermuele point out, presidential administration is constrained by public opinion and by the need
to maintain the President's credibility with other political actors. 16 ' But
these constraints operate primarily in the context of high-visibility
presidential initiatives, such as those taken during the national security
and economic crises that Professors Posner and Vermeule highlight in
their book. 166 Yet as Professor Strauss rightly notes, "Given the overwhelming complexity and activity level of modern government, White
House officials can attend to no more than a fraction of issues having to
be decided."' 67 On a day-to-day basis, the regulatory state affects a vast
array of interests that receive no media coverage and hence fail to
register in opinion polls tracking the approval rating of the President.
When the government sets safety standards for airplanes,'s regulates
pipeline rates,169 or audits tax returns, 7 ° the important constraints on the
government are those found in the statutes that establish these functions
162. See id. at 753-54 (arguing White House control of administrative decisionmaking
would substitute White House employees with limited expertise and authority, "out of the
reach of the APA and the Freedom of Information Act," for politically accountable agency
administrator acting with assistance from expert staff and operating with "enhanced
transparency and procedural regularity").
163. Thomas W. Merrill, The Disposing Power of the Legislature, 110 Colum. L. Rev.
452, 454 (2010).
164. Id. at 473-74.
165. See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 29, at 12 ("[E]ven an imperial president is
constrained by politics and public opinion.").
166. See id. at 12-15 (discussing increasing political constraints during perceived
emergencies such as 9/11 and 2008 financial crisis).
167. Strauss, Overseer, supra note 158, at 754.
168. See 14 C.F.R. § 25 (2012) (codifying Federal Aviation Administration's airworthiness standards for passenger transport airplanes).
169. See 18 C.F.R. § 342 (2012) (codifying Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's
determination of oil pipeline rates and methodologies).
170. See I.R.C. § 7601 (2012) (codifying Secretary of Treasury's authority to canvass
districts for taxable persons or objects).
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and the process agencies follow in implementing and enforcing them. If
one attends only to the statutory interpretation cases that reach the
Supreme Court, or to the way the procedural requirements of the APA
are implemented in national security emergencies, then it is possible to
71
imagine that these constraints are infinitely plastic and manipulable.1
But this mistakenly generalizes from the extraordinary to the ordinary.
To abandon the positivist tradition of administrative law, and allow large
swathes of the administrative state to be taken over by a presidential
administration subject only to the constraints of public opinion, would
invite arbitrariness and oppression in a vast number of regulatory contexts
that fly below the radar screen of media attention and public opinion.
Can presidential administration be rescued by calling on the process
tradition, as argued by then-Professor Kagan and the other defenders of
aggressive White House direction of the administrative state? Here, too, it is
doubtful that the process tradition, as implemented by lawyers who are part
of the executive branch, can serve the same legitimizing and constraining
functions we associate with traditional forms of administrative law.
One problem concerns the authority of internal reviewing institutions
to engage in process review absent some conferral of power to do so,
either by the Constitution or a relevant statute like the APA. When acting
in the positivist tradition, courts function as agents of sovereignty-either
the sovereign people who have adopted the Constitution or the sovereign legislature. Their judgments, assuming they are perceived as being
faithful to the law, are backed by the sovereign power of the government.
This means they are likely to be obeyed. An internal reviewing institution, in contrast, is unlikely to have any statutory mandate to insist the
administration adhere to judicially developed norms of reasonable
process. Federal courts in the United States may have enough institutional capital that they can insist that administrators adhere to norms
of reasoned decisionmaking whether or not such norms are compelled
by statute-at least for a time. But courts in other legal systems-not to
mention internal review institutions in settings where judicial review does
not exist-are unlikely to have enough institutional capital to impose
their judgments about reasoned decisionmaking on other government
actors. Enforcement of administrative law norms may come to be seen as
merely a matter of contestable opinion. 172 Instead of acting as a check on
administrative abuse, administrative law could devolve into a rationalization for the exercise of raw power.
171. See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 29, at 105 ("[I]t is inevitable, given the
background conditions of the administrative state, that the norms governing judicial
review of agency action will be embodied as loose standards and adjustable parameters.");
see also Adrian Vermeule, Our Schmittian Administrative Law, 122 Harv. L. Rev. 1095,
1098-105 (2009) (developing argument that modern administrative state cannot be
constrained by rule of law).
172. See Mashaw, Creating the Administrative Constitution, supra note 18, at 304
(observing "reason lies in the eye of the beholder").
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Another problem concerns the elusiveness of the elements of
process review. Of course, interpretation of positive law is often sharply
contested, especially where vague provisions (like due process or fair
rates) are involved. 7 3 But often enacted law is quite clear, or has been
determined over time to have a settled meaning, and in these contexts it
imposes real constraints on government behavior-at least when it is
understood that an independent institution like the courts stands ready
to enforce these provisions. As we have seen, however, once process
review slips beyond the confines of enacted law, it tends to fall back on
gauzy generalizations like transparency and accountability that 1 shift
74
If
around from one context to the next and are hard to pin down.
policy announced at a presidential news conference is "transparent," and
directives from the White House are "accountable" if they enter in some
small way into the approval ratings of the incumbent President, 75 then
the process tradition offers limitless possibilities for rationalizing unilateral policy initiatives taken at the direction of the President with or
without any sanction in law.
Finally, an administrative law limited to the process tradition would
have little or no capacity to enforce the evolved architecture of American
government. The written Constitution has undergone considerable
mutation over time through interpretation. But its basic postulates of
separation of powers, federalism, and protection of individual rights
continue to shape our political system. Maintenance of these postulates
requires continued exercise of review in the positivist tradition. 176 There
is also the not-small matter of what Professor Strauss has called77
"Congress's constitutional prerogatives in structuring government."'
How are the boundaries between different offices established by
Congress going to be enforced if some external review agent does not
enforce enacted law? It is true that non-judicial review, by institutions like
the OLC in the Department of Justice, is possible, and these institutions
can develop an internal culture that incorporates respect for enacted
law.178 Moreover, the interpretative norms employed by these institutions
may mimic those developed by courts-especially if judicial review is a
173. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2596-99, 2604 (2015)
(interpreting "due process of law" to mean same sex couples have right to marry, while
acknowledging this possibility did not emerge until late in twentieth century).
174. See supra Part II (pointing out these issues with transparency and accountability).
175. See Kagan, supra note 4, at 2331-32 ("First, presidential leadership enhances
transparency, enabling the public to comprehend more accurately the sources and nature of
bureaucratic power. Second, presidential leadership establishes an electoral link between the
public and the bureaucracy, increasing the latter's responsiveness to the former.").
176. See Jack M. Balkin, Living Originalism 35-58 (2011) (arguing written
Constitution-especially rule-like provisions--continues to provide basic structure of
government as we know it today).
177. Peter L. Strauss, Presidential Rulemaking, 72 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 965, 985 (1997).
178. See Trevor W. Morrison, Stare Decisis in the Office of Legal Counsel, 110 Colum.
L. Rev. 1448, 1460-70 (2010) (discussing OLC's structure and decisionmaking practices).
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realistic prospect. 179 But experience has shown that internal review institutions either bend to the political winds when they become imperative
or are displaced by other "legal advisors" who are more overtly political
in their orientation. 80 The fundamental point is that process review, by
asking whether individual government initiatives are "transparent" and
their proponents are in some sense "accountable," cannot address
questions of government structure or individual rights. An administrative
law de-linked from the positivist tradition will offer little resistance to
power politics. This would be a tragedy for our ongoing experiment in
democratic government.
Whether there is a solution to the challenge of presidential
administration is beyond the scope of this Essay. The root of the problem
is the inability of the Congress and the courts to expand their decisional
capacities to match the demands of a rapidly changing and globalizing
world, and the greater capacity of the White House to do so, at least in
relative terms. To some extent, the capacity limitations of the legislature
and judiciary are self-imposed, such as the Senate filibuster rules that
require sixty votes (out of 100 Senators) to move a bill to the floor,18 1 and
the Supreme Court's restrictive rules of judicial standing. 2 But whether
corrective mechanisms are available to head off the tide toward the
"plebisticiary presidency" endorsed by Professors Posner and Vermeule 8s
remains to be seen.
CONCLUSION

This Essay is about a growing phenomenon-executive or administrative policymaking that exceeds the scope of authority delegated by
democratically elected legislatures. Under conventional administrative
law precepts, such unilateral exercises of power would be struck down
under what this Essay calls the positivist tradition in administrative law. 184
But judicial review is incompletely available, and impatient and
aggressive executives have increasingly exploited these gaps to engage in
179. See id. at 1494 ("[A] rule of stare decisis similar to the one followed by courts has
long been believed to inhere in the legal advisory function originally discharged by the
Attorney General and later delegated to OLC.").
180. See Ackerman, supra note 100, at 109 ("We have seen that the entire setup at the
OLC-its mode of recruitment, its relationship to the White House, its deference to 'the
views of the President who currently holds office'-propels its top lawyers toward
presidential apologetics.").
181. See U.S. Senate Comm. on Rules & Admin., Rules of the Senate, Rule XXII,
http://www.rules.senate.gov/public/index.cfn?p=RuleXXII
[http://perma.cc/N9Z8-HRFU]
(stipulating debate may only be closed if "three-fifths of the Senators duly chosen and sworn"
vote to do so).
182. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992) (plurality
opinion) (setting out particular, narrow requirements for standing).
183. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 29, at 16.
184. See supra notes 5-8 and accompanying text (defining positivist tradition).
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policymaking without delegated authority.'8 5 Defenders of these innovations have drawn upon a second tradition in administrative law, what
this Essay calls the process tradition, to argue that unilateral executive
policymaking can be reconciled with the rule of law as long as it is
transparent and accountable. 186
The Essay has raised a number of questions about whether this justificatory strategy is plausible. Lawyers working within the executive
branch will have difficulty persuading their principals to adopt the
precepts of the process tradition if they are not required to do so by law,
and if the executive action is not subject to judicial review. Their task will
be made more difficult by the elusive nature of the requirements of the
process tradition. Even if they were to succeed, process review divorced
from the enforcement of positive law would undermine the evolved
structure of government, which is thoroughly dependent on enforcement of a complex body of statutory law, and rests on the fundamental
precept that the legislature, not the executive, holds the power to
allocate decisional power among the different institutions of our society.

185. See supra Part II (describing rise of presidential administration and lack of
judicial review).
186. See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text (discussing defense of
administrative actions as "transparent" and "accountable").

